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Abstract:  
This research investigates the mutual and diverging factors for successful and less 
successful innovations in software and manufacturing of machine tools in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). We apply univariate and multivariate analyses on 115 indicators by 
revisiting the seminal SAPPHO project based on the analysis of pairs of innovations and 
conducted at SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research during the 1970s. We aim 
to identify principal factors influencing firm success in innovation in the context of CEE and 
compare our results to those of SAPPHO and see whether any changes took place during 
the last 40 years in this context after several decades of globalization. Our initial findings 
from a database of 90 innovations and 45 pairs of innovations – introduced onto the 
market during the period 2007-2010 - from 51 CEE enterprises demonstrate that, in 
particular, user and market-driven factors differentiate successful innovations from less 
successful ones.  Our results fully confirm the continuing relevance of SAPPHO results 
and methodology. Successful innovators have stronger user orientation and better 
understanding of market demand. Although, CEECs are catching up economies, 
continuous and strategic R&D and innovation collaboration is essential to generation of 
greater commercial success from innovation activities.  Given the catching-up character of 
the CEECs this is surprising result which may reflect knowledge-intensive nature of two 
sectors which form the basis of our sample. Results of this research clearly demonstrate 
that orientation of the CEEC innovation policies is inconsistent with the characteristics and 
behaviour of successful innovators. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The sources of successful innovations have been the object of debate for quite some time 
in innovation studies (Schmookler, 1966; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979).  The Project 
SAPPHO1 (SPRU, 1972; 1974; Rothwell et al., 1974) represent clear milestone in this 
debate as it has clearly demonstrated that innovation is coupling of new technology with a 
market (Freeman and Soete, 1997, chapter 8). Either technology push or demand pull 
explanations of innovation process are one sided and successful innovators are 
distinguished by coupling of innovations with market demand and users needs. This 
important insight in the nature of innovation process is the major rationale why in this paper 
we have re-applied SAPPHO methodology in the case of knowledge intensive enterprises 
(KIE) in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). 
 
Why revisiting SAPPHO? First, we firmly believe that this methodology is insufficiently 
exploited in innovation studies which have become dominated by hypothesis testing and 
deduction based research with comparatively little exploratory research. Second, forty years 
after original SAPPHO we want to explore whether there are major changes in the nature of 
innovation process, especially in view of increased importance of innovation networks in the 
last 40 years. As science and technology interfaces have intensified so has increased the 
importance of external networks for success in innovation (see Dodgson and Rothwell, 
1994, p. 82 for references on this). Moreover, the latest trend towards open innovation 
model has further reinforced the role of users in innovation process (von Hippel, 1988; 
Chesbrough, 2003). Third, we are interested whether there are specific features of 
successful and less successful innovations in firms and countries that operate behind 
technology frontier.   
 
Why do we explore these issues in the catching up countries of CEE? First, we may expect 
that the role of R&D in innovation is reduced in these economies as their overall business 
expenditures on R&D are comparatively quite low but the role of users and markets should 
be important. If innovation is coupling between technology push and demand pull factors it 
is very interesting to explore whether and how this coupling takes place. Equally, the role of 
networks should be very important especially in view of openness of these economies. We 
explore factors of innovation success in the most knowledge intensive enterprises (KIE) in 
these economies. Hence, we would expect even more that the knowledge networks would 
play an important role. 
 
This research aims to understand the common and diverging factors for commercially 
successful innovation in knowledge-intensive enterprises (KIE) in three Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs), namely Hungary, Poland and Croatia. We focus on all the 
major factors driving innovation at firm level: technology, R&D, firm interactions, users and 
market demand. In doing so, we explore discriminating factors between successful and less 
successful innovations.  
                                                 
1 SAPPHO stands for Scientific Activity Predictor from Patterns with Heuristic Origins. 
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In this research, KIEs are defined as firms that are innovative, have significant knowledge 
intensity in their activity, and which explore and exploit innovative opportunities (Malerba 
and McKelvey, 2011). By definition KIE should have internal management, business model 
and organization that enable them to transform knowledge into innovation. KIE operates 
based on new products and processes (innovations) which are knowledge intensive and, 
hence both use and generation of knowledge are essential part of KIE.  
 
In the next section we review literature which is based on or related to SAPPHO 
perspective. Section three explains methodology (criteria for selection of firms and sectors, 
brief information on sectors in the CEE context, definitions of success in pairs of 
innovations, indicators and methods of analysis). Section four presents results in overall 
and by sectors (software and machine tools). Conclusions generalise based on empirical 
results from previous section. 
 
Our results fully confirm the continuing relevance of SAPPHO results and methodology. 
Forty years after and tested in different socio-economic context successful innovation is still 
about good coupling between technology and market. Successful innovators have stronger 
user orientation and better understanding of market demand. However, our results also 
point to interesting differences.  
 
 
2. SAPPHO FOCUSED LITERATURE: A REVIEW   
 
2.1. What is Project SAPPHO?2 
Project SAPPHO is a study of industrial innovation, more specifically management of 
innovation (Rothwell et al., 1977: 415), in two science-based industries, chemicals and 
scientific instruments. It was conceived as a systematic attempt to identify and evaluate the 
factors which distinguish innovations that achieved commercial success from those that 
have not. In SAPPHO, successful innovations are those that managed to establish a 
worthwhile market or profit. Less successful innovations are those that failed to establish a 
worthwhile market or profit even though technically they have been successes. SAPPHO, 
which has been a landmark study, showed how much a commercially successful innovation 
depends on non-technological factors – i.e. understanding of user needs, marketing, 
organisation, use of external knowledge sources and leadership (SPRU, 1972; Rothwell et 
al., 1974; Freeman, 1994). In essence, SAPPHO demonstrated that successful innovation 
is largely the case of coupling technology and market needs.  
 
Project SAPPHO refers to successful innovations as those that managed to establish a 
worthwhile market or profit as well as being technically successful. Griffin and Page (1996) 
also found market share as the most useful measure for assessing success in projects 
involving new-to-the-company products. Successful technology commercialization is 
defined as the whole process of acquiring ideas, developing and manufacturing saleable 
                                                 
2 This section draws on SPRU (1972; 1974). 
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goods, and selling the goods in a market (Mitchell and Singh, 1996:170; Cooper, 1993; 
2000).  
 
 
The originality and uniqueness of SAPPHO lie not only in its ambition to explore factors 
which distinguish between successful innovations from failures but also in its methodology – 
i.e. especially in the way that the data is arranged. The SAPPHO technique involved 
detailed comparison of ‘paired’ successful and unsuccessful innovations, where comparison 
between pairs was made using a large number of ‘project execution’ variables (Rothwell et 
al., 1977). It analysed 29 such pairs, 17 in chemicals and 12 in scientific instruments.  
 
The data were gathered by in-depth interviews in firms. From these interviews, 201 
measures were attempted. Most of these were comparative measurements which were 
designed to throw light on hypotheses previously advanced to explain innovation success, 
such as size of organisation, management techniques, characteristics of individuals, speed 
of development, structure of firm, communications environment of firm and relationship with 
the market. In the outcome, much of the statistical analyses were based not on 201 
measures but on 122 which proved to be statistically significant in binomial tests. Since the 
number of variables (122) largely exceeded the available number of observations (29 pairs), 
they have used multivariate techniques such as factor analyses and compound variable 
analysis to overcome this limitation.  
 
SAPPHO’s results yielded five underlying factors to discriminate between successful and 
failed innovations.  These can be very briefly listed as follows (emphasis ours): 
1. Successful innovators were seen to have a much better understanding of user 
needs. 
2. Successful innovators pay much more attention to marketing. 
3. Successful innovators perform their development work more efficiently than failures, 
but not necessarily more quickly. 
4. Successful innovators make more effective use of outside technology and scientific 
advice, even though they perform more of the work in-house. 
5. The responsible individuals in the successful attempts are usually more senior and 
have greater authority than their counterparts who fail. 
 
2.3 Importance of SAPPHO: Attention on user needs and markets 
SAPPHO was not confined to itself, it did not remain as a one-off research and paved the 
way for other studies that highlighted crucial aspects in innovation studies. Whereas 
SAPPHO found non-technological factors such as user needs and markets more influential 
on innovation success; several studies extended SAPPHO further by using SAPPHO data. 
For instance, Von Hippel’s (1976) key finding – by examining scientific instrument 
innovations only, since these were mostly significant product innovations in the SAPPHO 
data whereas chemical industry’s innovations were mostly incremental process innovations 
– was that almost 80% of the successful innovations involved substantial user collaboration 
whether at the stage of invention, prototyping or field testing. Moreover, von Hippel (1976: 
222) observes that the user-dominated pattern of innovating is not necessarily 
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accompanied by the manufacturer-dominated innovation process, implying the firm-internal 
efforts for R&D.  The importance of user/customer involvement in innovation has been the 
primary feature in von Hippel (1978, 1986, 1988), Baldwin and von Hippel (2011) and 
Lundvall (1985, 1988, 1992) as well as its primary role in the learning economy (Lundvall 
and Vining, 2005; Hyysalo, 2009; Johnson, 2011).  
 
Results of Project SAPPHO did not only explain what factors explain successful innovation, 
but they were also shedding light on what factors explain unsuccessful innovations. The 
latter has been largely overlooked even today. Spiller and Teubal (1977) analyzed 
innovation failures and found that failing to understand the precise structure of user needs 
and low level of market determinateness in the firm causes failures in innovation. Especially 
these extensions to SAPPHO on external market environment involved the ‘demand-pull’ 
approaches to the execution of innovation process (see Mowery and Rosenberg, 1979 for a 
critical review). The major lesson is that innovations should be conceived and developed 
with a careful regard to the differential customer benefits they offer which requires close 
links with the potential customers throughout different stages of development process 
(Littler, 1994). ICT has further enhanced the role of users in innovation process. For 
example, Von Hippel (2002) shows why firms would need to develop ‘user toolkits’ to 
involve users in the innovation process. This has been followed by recognition of strategic 
importance of open innovation models at both micro (Chesbrough, 2003) and at macro-
levels (De Backer et al, 2008) where users’ considerations are not only influencing but 
driving innovation process. 
 
SAPPHO approach oriented literature is largely focused on better understanding of factors 
that discriminate between successful and less successful innovators or failures. Since the 
original SAPPHO publications a rich stream of literature has tried to answer on similar 
questions but in different contexts. The focus of SAPPHO inspired research is to explore 
whether successful innovations originate largely from own or external R&D, whether firms 
innovate by interacting with external actors, observing the market, answering the user 
needs, etc. We investigate factors such as firm interactions (Hakansson, 1989; Hagedoorn 
and Schakenraad, 1990; Gelsing, 1992; Laursen and Salter, 2004), R&D conduct –both 
external and internal to firm- (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Kim, 1997a, 1997, 1998, 1999; 
Tether and Tajar, 2008), user involvement (von Hippel, 1988; Lundvall, 1992) and market 
effects on successful and less successful innovations. 
 
This research re-visits Project SAPPHO (SPRU, 1972; 1974; Rothwell et al., 1974) in the 
context of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) to evaluate the factors which distinguish 
successful innovations from less successful ones. Many factors that affect innovation are 
external factors and thus may impinge on firms’ innovation success. We are interested if 
there are specific environmental factors which affect innovation process and which are 
shared by other economies that operate behind technology frontier. Interestingly SAPPHO 
‘pair comparison’ technique was applied to the investigation of twelve success-failure pairs 
in the Hungarian electronics industry in 1974 (Szakasits, 1974 ). Rothwell (1974) in 
reviewing this study comments that ‘considering the differences which exist between the 
centralized Hungarian communist system and the Western capitalist free enterprise system, 
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the results of the SPRU and Hungarian studies are remarkably similar, both of them 
highlighting the importance of need satisfaction, the importance of good communications, 
(both internal and external), the necessity for efficient development, the advantages of a 
market orientation, and the crucial role played by certain key individuals in bringing about 
success. It is reassuring to see that, despite political and cultural differences, innovators 
are, beneath the skin, much the same everywhere!’ (p38). In revisiting SAPPHO our 
interests are to explore whether differences still exist and whether they are systemic or 
largely developmental.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This research focuses on pairs of successful and less successful innovations in knowledge-
intensive enterprises (KIEs). We will be able to find out which are the discriminating factors 
at the level of innovation that influence commercial success. We aim to uncover the 
characteristics of factors which both types of innovations (successful and less successful) 
share and in which respect they diverge.3  
 
As a first requirement of the research design, the implementation of SAPPHO methodology 
relies on strict criteria/rules with regard to selection of sectors, firms, innovations and their 
pairings. We describe these below staying within the boundaries of our research, from 
which this section draws. 
 
3.1. Selection of sectors: Sector characteristics in CEE4 
We have first selected two sectors, namely software and manufacturing of machine tools. 
These two sectors are quite relevant for the CEECs as the new member states of the 
European Union for two reasons. First, they have inherited good competencies in 
mechanical technologies from the socialist period. Second, they are being integrated into 
global value chains in new areas like ICT and software.   
 
Companies operating in the software sector in the CEE are largely oriented towards local 
markets (Radosevic, 2006). Demand-side problems continue to be significant barriers for 
the development of knowledge intensive entrepreneurship (KIE) due to the relatively low 
purchasing power in the CEE markets. A low level of knowledge-intensive services 
indicates low degree of sophistication of demand, which is largely confined on 
customization. The industry in the developed EU (i.e. Germany, UK, Sweden, Denmark) is 
also oriented towards local markets but its share of global orientation is significantly more 
present than in the CEE and requirements from local firms are more demanding. There is a 
thin layer of companies in CEE countries which are either fully export-oriented or are among 
                                                 
3 In this respect, our methodology differs from SAPPHO which has been able to identify outright failures and successes. 
We expect that our focus on relative, not absolute, success will influence robustness of our results. Nevertheless, we 
think that good research design based on SAPPHO will enable us to generate even more relevant research results. This 
approach was initially applied in PhD dissertation of George Tsekouras (SPRU PhD) on the best practices of knowledge 
integration of firms in Greece who was initially supervised by Roy Rothwell.   
4 This section draws on Project AEGIS Work Package 4.2 primary reports by Gable, J. et al. (2012) and Radosevic and 
Yoruk (2012).  
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technology leaders in their market niches. Technological opportunities for companies in the 
CEE are limited due to low R&D intensity, lower productivity and smaller size of their firms 
when compared to the developed EU. This leads to limited organisational capabilities and 
below minimum economies of scale for export-led growth. Developed EU countries have 
visible regional ICT clusters while they have not yet emerged in the CEECs. They also have 
difficulties in attracting skilled software labour though to different degrees. Institutional 
opportunities seem to be the area with the smallest gap between developed EU and the 
CEE. For example, Sweden and Croatia have both low level of co-operation in ICT between 
industry and academy. However, in Sweden it is a sector composed of public research 
institutes and consultancies that compensates for this gap, while there is no such 
compensatory mechanism in Croatia. Software industry does not operate based on specific 
sectoral regulatory regime and hence national regulatory framework largely applies to this 
industry.  
 
In the machine tools sector, market opportunities in Poland and Czech Republic seem 
promising when compared to the developed EU countries. For instance, machine tool 
sector in the UK, where demand has been largely oriented towards standardized (general 
purpose) goods of medium quality range corresponding to less demanding and less 
sophisticated buyers, has been witnessing negative growth in its market value (-32% 
between 2000 and 2007). CEEC, on the other hand, have experienced positive, and in case 
of the Czech machine tools sector, very significant growth. However, technological and 
productivity level of industry in the CEECs is much lower when compared to the developed 
EU. CEE technology-wise lags behind as indicated in the low productivity rate in the sector 
and lower R&D intensity. Links between technology, productivity and growth of industry 
seem to be mutually dissociated largely due to globalisation and impact of value chains. For 
example, the Czech industry fares very well in terms of average turnover per employee but 
is far behind in terms of gross value added per employee. This suggests that the Czech 
industry is well integrated internationally in global supply chains but in terms of 
technological level falls behind developed EU. Moreover, the R&D intensity of the Czech 
industry is falling. Yet, co-operation in both the Czech and Croatian machine tools industries 
seems to be not less present than in developed EU countries. In machine tools industry, as 
in software, there is no strong sectoral regulatory regime and hence national regulations are 
quite relevant. There is interesting difference between Poland and other countries as 
Poland does not have associations representing machine tool producers, who tend to 
belong rather to associations of the industries they produce for.  
 
The selection of sectors does not automatically ensure that any firm within these sectors 
should be considered a KIE. In order to select true KIE we apply the following main and 
auxiliary criteria. 
 
3.2. Selection of firms: Two major criteria 
In this research, KIEs are defined as firms that are innovative, have significant knowledge 
intensity in their activity, and which explore and exploit innovative opportunities. KIE have 
internal management, business model and organization that enable them to transform 
knowledge into innovation. KIE operates based on new products and processes 
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(innovations) which are knowledge intensive and, hence both use and generation of 
knowledge are essential part of KIE.  
 
We apply two major criteria for selection of firms to be included in the sample: 
1. The firm should be registered that its major activity is in sectors: software and 
machine tools. 
2. The firm should be innovative. It should have introduced new products, processes or 
services onto the market during the last three years. 
 
Apart from the main criteria above, a selected firm should also meet at least one of the 
auxiliary criteria below: 
1. It is employing highly skilled personnel (MSc, PhDs) in engineering sciences, or 
2. It is continuously (not intermittently) investing in R&D, or 
3. It has registered patents. 
 
3.3. Pairs of innovations and definition of success 
The pairing technique has already being used for a long while in natural sciences; 
especially biology and chemistry (see MacKay and Bernal (1966) but its use in innovation 
studies is not very common. It allows for discerning patterns of strict dichotomies – i.e. in 
this research, success and less success. For the purposes of this research, pairs are not 
identical twins. Their similarity is defined in terms of product similarity aiming at similar 
markets – i.e. they may adapt different technical solutions. The technology fields of the 
innovations in the sample are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. Fields of technology related to pairs of innovations. 
Machine Tools sector Software sector 
Tool making  
Pasting machines 
Welding, cutting and bending machines  
 High speed motor spindles 
 CNC Lathes 
CNC Milling machines 
CNC Milling machine parts 
CNC Drilling machines 
CNC Grinding machines 
Hydraulic presses 
Machine parts 
 IT security  
Knowledge management  
 Language technology  
ERP-Enterprise resource planning 
Financial management 
Internet portals 
Operating systems 
 
We do not consider failed innovations since all the innovations in our sample have been in 
the market. Yet, some innovations are much more successful than others in commercial 
terms, i.e. greater growth in sales. Indeed, degree of success was brought into attention in 
Rothwell et al. (1974: 269) when attempting to measure the overall success identified by  
 
(1) Net direct monetary gain, accruing from the sale and/or licensing of the innovation and from the 
sale of technical know-how generated through the innovation. 
(2) Market share, in terms of the number of units sold and the average sales price per unit. 
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(3) Alignment with company strategy. 
 
We search for factors underpinning differences in successful and less successful 
innovations based on the definitions below. 
 
Definition: Successful innovations are those that managed to establish a worthwhile 
market or profit. Less successful innovations are those that failed to establish a worthwhile 
market or profit even though technically they have been successes.  
 
The difficulty is that success is not always self-evident. We differentiated between 
successful and less successful innovations by directly asking the interviewees about the 
growth of sales figure related to the innovation after its launch – i.e. whether it has been 
increasing very fast (more than 20%), fast (between 10 to 20%), slow (between 3 to 10%) 
or whether it has been static (between -3 and 3%) or declining (less than -3%). If the sales 
growth figure for the innovation was very fast or fast, we considered it to be a successful 
innovation. If it was slow, static or declining, we considered it to be a less successful 
innovation. In order to make sure that we received reliable answers for growth rates of 
innovations, we also asked about the amount of turnover for the innovation (one year after 
its launch and current). We used the latter to double-check the former; though the indicator 
has considerable number of missing values, since the firms are reluctant to reveal their 
fiscal measures in the CEECs due to tax-related issues.  
 
Table 2 below shows the distribution of innovations, by country, sector and success vs. less 
success. We must note that we indeed have information about 118 innovations, however 
only 90 of these provided reliable information to be able to be paired reliably. 
 
Table 2. Distribution of innovations, by country, sector and success. 
 Software Machine Tools Total 
 Success Less 
Success 
Success Less 
Success 
Success Less 
Success 
Czech 
Republic 
- - 10 13 10 13 
Croatia 6 12 1 1 7 13 
Poland 15 8 10 5 23 15 
Hungary 3 4 0 2 3 6 
Total 24 24 21 21 45 45 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
Face-to-face interviews were conducted with managers in 51 firms in Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Croatia during April-May 2011. The managers have been asked 
structured questions related to the market conditions, their networks, research activities and 
institutional structure in connection with each of their innovations that they have introduced 
onto the market between 2007 and 2010. Information was also sought about the founders 
and establishment stage of the firm.  
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3.5. Coding the Pairs and the Dataset 
Pairing of similar innovations – one successful, the other less successful – allows 
comparisons to be made avoiding the problem of absolute scales.  Depending on whether 
an individual measure, compared within a particular pair, is judged to weigh in favour of 
success (S > LS), in favour of less success (S < LS), or neither (S=LS), it is accorded a 
coding of + 1, - 1 or 0, respectively. Thus, a particular relation i on the successful and less 
successful innovations defines vectors respectively Si and LSi of dimension 45, made up of 
1s and 0s.  
 
 
3.6. Operationalization of Concepts 
The research initially encompassed 114 individual indicators to assess for factors identifying 
successful from less successful innovations. 114 indicators have involved the details about 
firm interactions ranging from universities, research institutes, consultant and suppliers as 
well as the type of interactions ranging from strategic alliances to R&D agreement and 
subcontracting. They also included almost all possible details about the design activities in 
the firm and the external contributors (i.e. customers, suppliers, universities, etc.) to design 
activities at any level. The questionnaire sought detailed information about the conduct of 
R&D at firm level as well as any external contributor to R&D activity and systematic R&D in 
the firm for the specific innovation in the absence of a formal R&D unit. Among the 
indicators, there were also finance and market-related ones.5 Table A1 in appendix 
presents all the indicators studied in this research.  
 
3.7   Methods of Analysis 
The ultimate aim of this research, albeit at this stage, is largely of an exploratory nature as 
we do not prefer to state priory hypotheses regarding factors that discriminate successful 
from less successful innovations. Our intention is to repeat SAPPHO and compare our 
findings with it. 
 
The number of variables greatly exceeds the number of cases (observations or paired 
innovations). Hence, the initial method to summarise information is based on multivariate 
analysis: 
- binomial tests on all variables, 
- examine interdependencies and aggregate variables into small number of ‘integrated 
factors’ via  factor analysis (index variables). 
 
First, all 115 indicators have been subject to binomial tests which comprised of eliminating 
the indicators that showed no differences between successful and less successful 
innovations. A careful implementation of this procedure resulted in 17 indicators which 
showed statistically significant differences between successful and less successful 
innovations within acceptable limits as required by statistical tests. 
 
  
                                                 
5 The survey questionnaire is available from the authors upon request. 
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4.  THE RESULTS 
 
Our measures of innovation success are measures of commercial success, especially 
relative commercial success within the pair of firms, and not their technical success. From 
economic perspective, innovation is relevant only as long as it is introduced and 
successfully commercialized on the market. We are interested in factors that discriminate 
successful from less successful innovations within pairs of firms that operate not only in 
identical sectors but also on similar or identical markets. Hence, our approach explores 
which factors discriminate between firms in their effort to ensure commercial success. 
These factors have to do not only with R&D results but also with recognition of user needs. 
Moreover, our measures differentiate between factors which may originate from better 
articulation of needs of specific user (needs) and better articulation of market demand 
(wants). As rightly pointed by Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) this is important distinction in 
understanding demand vs. supply determinants of innovations.  By the same token, our 
measures take into account so called ‘market determinateness’ or ‘the degree of specificity 
of the market signals received by the innovating firm and consequently the extent to which it 
anticipates (instead of responding to) demand’ (Spiller and Teubal, 1977). 
 
4.1 Both Industries 
 
We started with univariate analysis –a binomial test- to select the subset of elementary 
measures which distinguish between successful and less successful innovations. The 
statistical significance of a distribution, using the binomial test, gives the probability of the 
observed pattern of +1’s and -1’s occurring naturally. The smaller this probability, the 
greater is the statistical significance of the measure for success (or less success). A full list 
of indicators examined in this research is provided in Appendix Table A1 illustrating the 
number of successful and less successful innovations and their binomial tests for both 
industries and by each industry separately. For both industries (N=45 pairs of innovations) 
17 indicators emerge to be statistically significant (p < 0.1) and thus were found to show the 
greatest differences between successful and less successful innovations.  The results of the 
binomial tests are given in Table 4 for these 17 significant variables, the measures being 
grouped in four emerging areas as user involvement and orientation, understanding 
markets, R&D management and collaboration, and innovation source and collaboration. 
These are derived originally from a series of principal component analyses. Table 3 
presents the results of factor analysis for a 4 factor model which allows for a momentous 
interpretation of factor loadings.6 This 4 factor model forms the basis for the categorization 
of statistically significant indicators into four major subgroups in Table 4.  
 
Left hand columns in Table 4 list measures that explain success and less success 
irrespective of whether their contribution is a priory positive or negative. In order to get clear 
                                                 
6 Several of the exercises with factor analysis (i.e. a 3 factor model and a 5 factor model) have been presented in 
Appendix Tables A2 and A3. We have also undertaken exploratory factor analysis jointly on all 17 indicators for which 
binomial tests were significant. This yielded 6 factor loadings and this is not much different from a 5 factor model in 
terms of statistical measures.  
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idea on contribution of different measures we give negative signs to measures whose 
presence actually reduces probability of greater success. This enables us to achieve 
comparable scores across all observations and calculate average score for each of the four 
groups of factors and create a compound indicator. This simple operation shows that 
presence of close interaction with users, market-led (as opposed to technology-led) 
innovation, and strategic and continuous but well implemented R&D and networking (even 
though limited to subcontracting type of relationships and collaborations with foreign firms 
for design activities)  are closely associated with comparatively greater commercial 
success.  
 
Subsequently, we have tested coherence of this grouping through confirmatory factor 
analysis (CFA) for each of these sub-groups. (Table 4 right hand side columns). As Table 4 
shows the latent variables explain in between 23% to 53% variance in underlying 
measures. The findings from this exercise show that users’ orientation is very important and 
indeed ‘user involvement and orientation’ component is statistically the most robust 
component significantly influenced by the involvement of users during the development 
stage of the innovation. A considerably higher number of more successful innovators had 
been more active in terms of involving users in development, educating them, and have 
identified problems immediately after launch of the product/process. On the other hand, in 
more number of less successful innovations, firms did not take steps to educate users or 
has not done modifications as result of users’ experience. However, the findings also show 
that user – producer interaction vary in terms of modalities of interaction. Successful 
innovators have relied very much on users during development of innovation so that user 
problems could become apparent only after launch. Other successful innovators have taken 
a lot of steps to educate users or they identified potential users’ problems in early stages of 
development or immediately after launch. In cases when users were involved in 
development there was not need to educate users or do modifications. In short, we see a 
variety of modalities in which interaction with  users occur but whatever was the mode of 
involvement the presence or lack of interaction with users is strong discriminatory variable 
between successful and less successful innovators (see compound indicators 11.75 vs. 
1.75 in Table 4). 
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Table 3. Confirmatory factor analyses results for a 4 factor model (N=45). 
 
 
Indicators
user 
involvement 
and 
orientation
understanding 
market 
R&D 
management 
and 
collaboration
innovation 
source and 
collaboration
Potential users were invo lved a lo t during the development stage o f the innovation 0.832 ‐0.171 0.050 0.061
A lot of steps were taken to educate the users ‐0.524 0.280 0.375 ‐0.435
If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch 0.596 0.178 ‐0.008 ‐0.234
The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm ‐0.362 ‐0.520 0.208 0.186
The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge ‐0.003 0.793 0.067 ‐0.077
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was the entire R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation ‐0.067 ‐0.001 0.484 ‐0.361
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the pro ject manager for the innovation in your firm 
was the leading/responsible person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 0.115 ‐0.602 0.347 ‐0.164
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number of qualified scientists and engineers in this 
external R&D department 0.210 0.018 0.863 0.184
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was part o f the R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation ‐0.151 ‐0.200 0.613 0.131
The kind of co llaboration was subcontracting ‐0.057 0.073 ‐0.049 0.649
Foreign firms contributed to  design activities ‐0.254 0.474 0.373 0.335
The innovation arose partly in the company 0.385 0.266 0.297 0.549
The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests ‐0.141 ‐0.168 0.149 0.639
Innovation management 
and collaboration
Rotation: Varimax, Kaiser‐Meyer‐Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.302, Bartlett's Test of  Sphericity is significant at 0.000, total variance 
explained (cum %): 55.40.
Table 4. Statistically significant indicators for surveyed firms’ pairs of innovations and results of confirmatory factor analyses (N=45). 
 
 
Significant indicators   successful 
innovations1,3
less successful 
innovations2,3
sig. (2‐tailed) CFA loadings    
CFA loadings 
for Inn Mang& 
Collab. (grey 
shaded areas)   
KMO
Bartlett's 
sphericity 
sig.
Total 
variance 
explained 
(Cum %)
Potential users were involved a lot during the development stage of the innovation 22 10 0.050 0.915 0.381 0.000 53.1
A lot of steps were taken to educate the users 16 5 0.027 ‐0.741
No steps were taken at all to educate the users ‐3 ‐12 0.035 _
If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch 12 4 0.077 0.453
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 11.75 1.75
The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm 13 3 0.021 0.786 0.521 0.284 44.92
The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge 16 5 0.027 ‐0.633
The innovation involved going into an unrelated market area ‐1 ‐8 0.039 _
The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests 18 7 0.043 0.575
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 11.5 1.75
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was the entire R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation 1 12 0.003 0.240 0.348 0.426 0.068 36.65
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the project manager for the innovation in your firm 
was the leading/responsible person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 6 0 0.031 0.578 0.337 0.366 0.035 23.62
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number of qualified scientists and engineers in this 
external R&D department 12 4 0.077 0.864 0.803
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was part of the R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation 15 6 0.078 0.572 0.216
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 8.5 5.5
The kind of collaboration was subcontracting 9 2 0.065 0.817 0.373 0.488 0.125 45.61
Foreign firms contributed to design activities 9 2 0.065 0.572 0.554
The innovation arose partly in the company 3 10 0.092 0.611 0.530
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 7.00 4.67
The innovation was new to the firm ‐5 ‐19 0.007
The innovation was new to the country 14 5 0.064
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 4.5 ‐7
Degree of 
novelty
1. Observations for success better than/more than less success.  2. Observations for success worse than/less than less success.  3. We have used inverted scores for some indicators (harmful effect negative) when calculating the 
compound indicators.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis results and testsObservations for 
All firms (N=45)
User 
involvement and 
orientation
Understanding 
markets
R&D 
management and 
collaboration
Innovation source 
and collaboration
Innovation 
management 
and 
collaboration
 
Successful innovators innovated with the view of market demand which was estimated in 
several ways. The most effective ways were by taking into account requests of customers - 
i.e. early identification of needs (customers’ requests) or based on the previous knowledge 
or based on market research.  So we see that ‘market determinateness’ or the capacity of 
the firm to anticipate needs is confounded with the explicit reception of the market signals. 
Probability of success was reduced when innovator was not involved in its core area, but 
the innovation ended up going into unrelated market area. There seems to be trade off 
between estimation of market demand based on the previous knowledge (experience 
based) or market research versus that of via explicit customers’ requests (Table 3). Only 
one successful innovator has entered into unrelated market area which is clearly opposite 
to 16 successful entries based on the previous experience (Table 4). However, despite 
differences in modes of interaction with market the intensity of interaction of successful 
innovators is significantly higher when compared to less successful innovators (see 
compound indicators 11.5 vs. 1.75 in Table 4). One factor model CFA appears to be 
statistically not significant for this component. The greater relative significance of users 
(needs) rather than demand (wants) is confirmation of Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) point 
in their analysis of supply and demand factors in innovation process. The strong role of 
users in estimating demand is  more associated with the ‘innovation source and 
collaboration’ component in 4 factor model CFA rather than with ’understanding  market’ 
component (see Table 3). This further supports and confirms the crucial and determining 
role of users in innovation which seem to be involved in a kind of collaborative innovation.   
 
By being latecomers and operating in catching up context it could be expected that for KIEs 
in CEE R&D is not the major distinguishing factor in innovation successes. This is even 
more so if we look at national level and compare business expenditures on R&D in CEECs 
with more developed economies. Yet, our data indicate that some aspects of R&D 
management and collaboration do indeed discriminate successful innovations from less 
successful innovations in CEECs (Table 3). It is striking that one of the major distinguishing 
factors is the size of R&D team in the external R&D department whereas in SAPPHO 
project it was the size of R&D team in the firm (Freeman and Soete, 1997, p.216). These 
differences seem logical given that SAPPHO sample involved primarily large firms in the 
advanced countries while our sample consists largely of smaller enterprises in the CEECs 
where firms seek to exploit external R&D opportunities available to them. This may also 
suggest that official R&D statistics underestimate the R&D which is undertaken within KIEs 
and which does not conform to criteria of formalised R&D activity as defined in Frascati 
Manual. Additional to that, firm’s project manager taking responsibility for the innovation 
research at the external R&D department led to success as further confirmation to strategic 
approach to R&D.   
 
Less successful cases were associated with strategic approach to R&D when the entire 
R&D department was involved in innovation but that did not lead to comparatively greater 
success (Table 4). On the contrary, strategic approach to R&D when part of the R&D 
department was involved in innovation did lead to comparatively greater success. This may 
suggest careful division of labour in the R&D department in a strategic sense but also 
available resources of firms.  
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As for the sources of innovation, successful firms were more involved in collaborative 
subcontracting with foreign firms involved in design. When innovation did not arise entirely 
from the company but involved external innovation inputs, this was not associated with 
comparatively greater success (Table 4). This may point to difficulties that networking in 
innovation can generate and may explain our results on limited networking activities as 
discriminating factor between successful and less successful cases.  
 
 Networking has become one of the dominant features of innovation process. This is 
depicted in changing models of innovation process where interactivity, strategic and 
technology integration dominates (Dodgson et al, 2008) as well as in summaries of 
empirical evidence on the role of inter-organizational networks in innovation process 
(Powell and Grodal, 2005). The issue of networks of innovators is thought to be especially 
important for smaller firms as in our sample. However, our results show that this is only 
partially true in the context of the CEECs. Out of many network type measures used only 
two indicators – subcontracting kind of collaboration and foreign firms’ contribution in design 
activities – discriminate between successful and less successful innovators. This is self-
explanatory as CEECs are highly open economies very much dependent on trade and FDI. 
Vertical linkages with buyers are already taken into account in factors which group user and 
market oriented measures. Moreover, foreign firms contribution to design loads similarly to 
three factors (understanding markets, R&D management and collaboration, and innovation 
collaboration) but not in factor ‘user involvement and orientation’ (see 4 factor model CFA in 
Table 3).  However, customer involvement is very strong in innovation collaboration factor. 
We should bear in mind that there is difference between users and customers. Foreign 
partners may be customers but not necessary users. We think that this largely explains why 
there is close involvement of foreign clients but not necessarily foreign users. CEE firms are 
involved in value chains only in production stages and rarely have direct access to users 
(McGowan et al, 2004). 
 
In overall, average compound indicators, tests of significance and CFA show that the major 
discriminating factors are in areas of user involvement and orientation, and in 
understanding of markets. ‘R&D management and collaboration’ and ‘Innovation sources 
and collaboration’ groups are also differentiating between successful and less successful 
innovators power but with on average less statistical power and significance. Also, 
coherence of these two groups of factors is smaller as they can fit two factor as well as one 
factor solution ‘innovation management and collaboration’.  Partly, this may be due to our 
sample which involves two industries with somewhat different innovation models where 
R&D and innovation management factors are different.  
 
Degree of novelty is an ‘outcome’ not ‘input’ variable and hence we do not include it in 
confirmatory FA (Table 4). By outcome we mean that degree of ambition of innovation is not 
necessarily a factor which distinguishes successful from less successful innovations/firms. 
In fact, factors which discriminate successful from less successful innovations/firms are 
those that de facto may raise degree of ambition of innovation – i.e. they could be 
endogenous to factors of success.  Successful firm is more likely also to have more 
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ambitious innovation. Finally, we are interested in differences between firms irrespective of 
degree of their ambition but largely based on whether they employ factors that based on our 
results indicate significantly higher probability of successful commercialization of their 
innovation. 
 
4.2 Software Industry  
 
The indicators that were found to show the greatest differences between successful and 
less successful innovations as a result of binomial tests are presented for both of the 
industries (Table 5). The results for the software sector separately are not substantially 
different from the pattern that we observed for the whole sample. User involvement and 
orientation and understanding of market needs are confirmed as two groups of factors 
which differentiate between successful and less successful Innovations. Market-led 
innovation process was enhanced by highly competitive market situation which increased 
probability of success when innovator was involved in its core area and has reduced 
probability of success when going into unrelated market area. Additional factors in 
‘understanding markets’ group are competition factors, especially intensity of competition. 
Innovations that faced competitors in the same field and from the start of the innovation 
project were relatively more successful. We mentioned above that discriminating factors for 
R&D and innovation management variables are relatively less significant when compared to 
user and market factors. This is reinforced in software sector where based on compound 
indicators we do not get clear differentiation in R&D and innovation management factors 
although these factors are significantly loading on common underlying factor. 
 
4.3. Machine Tools Industry 
 
Factors that differentiate between successful and less successful cases in machine tools 
(MT) industry are much less present when compared to software industry. It seems that MT 
firms are much more homogenous in terms of user involvement and understanding of 
markets when compared to software firms. This is partly due to our sample which involves a 
large number of Czech firms that have emerged out of the large socialist-era machine tools 
producers and which are thus structurally quite similar.  However, it is striking that the major 
discriminating factor between successful and less successful innovations is their strategic 
approach towards R&D collaboration. Firms that involved external R&D units with larger 
R&D teams, which involved research institutes based on R&D agreement were more likely 
to have more successful innovations. This strategic approach to R&D is reflected in the 
larger number of successful cases having innovation new to the country rather than new to 
the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Statistically significant indicators for surveyed firms’ pairs of innovations by industry and results of confirmatory factor analyses. 
 
Significant indicators   successful innovations1,3
less successful 
innovations2,3
sig. (2‐
tailed)
successful 
innovations1,3
less successful 
innovations2,3
sig. (2‐
tailed)
CFA 
loadings3     
KMO
Bartlett's 
sphericity 
sig.
Total variance 
explained 
(Cum %)
No steps were taken at all to educate the users 0 ‐8 0.008 _ _ _ _ 0.383 0.065 48.23
Potential users were involved a lot during the development stage of the innovation 13 3 0.021 _ _ _ 0.792
A lot of steps were taken to educate the users 12 3 0.035 _ _ _ 0.539
Potential users were not involved at all during the development stage of the innovation 0 ‐5 0.063 _ _ _ _
If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch 9 2 0.065 _ _ _ 0.116
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 7 ‐1
The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm 8 1 0.039 _ _ _ 0.748 0.577 0.082 35.26
The innovation involved going into an unrelated market area 0 ‐6 0.031 _ _ _ 0.104
The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge 11 3 0.057 _ _ _ ‐0.726
The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests 11 3 0.057 _ _ _ 0.779
There were a little after sales problems ‐9 ‐2 0.065 _ _ _ ‐0.041
There were competitors already at work in the same field when it was decided to pursue 
the innovation 12 4 0.077 _ _ _ 0.522
The market situation confronting the firm in its regular product lines at the start of the 
innovation project was highly competitive 9 2 0.065 _ _ _ ‐0.699
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 6 0.71
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was the entire R&D department in 
the firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation 0 7 0.016 _ _ _ 0.914 0.502 0.002 59.32
The innovation arose partly in the company 0 6 0.031 _ _ _ 0.434
The kind of collaboration was subcontracting 6 0 0.031 _ _ _ 0.869
Amount of  total R&D expenditure for the innovation 10 3 0.092 _ _ _ _
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the project manager for the innovation in your 
firm was the leading/responsible person for this R&D work in the external R&D 
department
_ _ _ 6 0 0.031 0.741 0.465 0.618 36.62
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number of qualified scientists and engineers in 
this external R&D department _ _ _ 10 2 0.039 0.763
If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the research institute _ _ _ 6 0 0.031 0.004
The kind of collaboration was R&D agreement _ _ _ 10 2 0.039 0.577
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 4 4 8 1
The innovation was new to the firm ‐3 ‐12 0.039 _ _ _
The innovation was new to the country 9 2 0.065 _ _ _
C o mpo und indicato r (average) 3 ‐5 _ _ _
Degree of 
novelty
Innovation 
management 
and 
collaboration
Software (N=24) Machine Tools (N=21)
1. Observations for success better than/more than less success.  2. Observations for success worse than/less than less success.  3. We have used inverted scores for some indicators (harmful effect negative) when calculating the compound indicators.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis results and testsObservations for  Observations for 
User 
involvement and 
orientation
Understanding 
markets
4.4. A Discussion on Non-significant Indicators 
 
Finally, we present Table 6 illustrating indicators which appear to be not significant (albeit at 
10-20% level). Findings that are statistically not strongly significant sometimes are valuable 
as findings that are practically significant, especially in view of limited sample size 
(Goodman, 2008). Early detection of user problems was somewhat more present in 
successful than less successful cases. Also, non- involvement of users or later detection of 
their problems or no modifications as results of user experiences characterise more less 
successful innovators.  In R&D management area successful innovators were more 
involved in R&D collaboration. Also, if they did not have formal R&D unit they had at least a 
systematic and periodic screening of R&D area. Successful innovators were more likely to 
collaborate with R&D institutes or to rely on innovation from outside. However, if source of 
innovation was external individual innovation was less successful as well as when 
collaboration was based on licence agreement.  Finally, some inconsistent or difficult to 
explain results like design activities and leading person for innovation project reflect industry 
differences and small sample. However, it may be also argued that these findings show that 
some elementary issues with regard to successful innovations are lacking in the CEE 
context.  
 
Table 6. Distribution of selected statistically not significant indicators within four major groups (0.1 < 
p < 0.2). 
 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Our results fully confirm the continuing relevance of SAPPHO results and methodology (see 
Table 7). Forty years after and tested in different socio-economic context successful 
innovation is still about good coupling between technology and market. In this respect, the 
Machine tools sector  (N=21)
statement ‐ indicator successful  less  
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
successful  less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
successful  less  
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
46 Potential users were not involved at all during the development stage of the innovation ‐1 ‐6 0.125 0 5 0.063 1 1 1.000
48 If there were user problems, they became apparent early in development 14 7 0.189 8 4 0.388 6 3 0.508
49 If there were user problems, they became apparent later in development ‐2 ‐8 0.109 1 6 0.125 1 2 1.000
56 No modifications  were introduced as  a result of user experience ‐2 ‐7 0.180 0 3 0.250 2 4 0.500
28 The kind of collaboration was  R&D agreement 11 4 0.118 1 2 1.000 10 2 0.039
67
There was  a formal R&D department in the firm and the chief engineer of the firm was  the 
leading person in the R&D department  5 6 1.000 0 4 0.125 5 2 0.219
69
There was  a formal R&D department in the firm and project manager of the innovation was the 
leading/responsible person in the R&D department 1 6 0.125 1 2 1.000 0 4 0.125
72
There was  a formal R&D department in the firm and the staff in the R&D department worked in 
sections  based on academic disciplines 2 4 0.688 0 4 0.125 2 0 0.500
77
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was  conducted at a 
university R&D department 8 4 0.388 0 2 0.500 8 2 0.109
78
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was  conducted at a 
research institute R&D department 4 1 0.375 0 1 1.000 4 0 0.125
86
If there was no formal R&D unit in the firm, there was a systematic and periodically 
reconsidered R&D program 10 4 0.180 5 2 0.727 5 2 0.219
8 The innovation arose solely from outside the company 4 0 0.125 3 0 0.250 1 0 _
14 For the innovations which originated from outside, the individual(s) was the main source 0 4 0.125 0 4 0.125 0 0 _
19 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the research institute 7 2 0.180 1 2 1.000 6 0 0.031
30 The kind of collaboration was  licensing agreement 0 4 0.125 0 4 0.125 0 0 _
Degree of 
novelty
1 The innovation was new to the firm 5 19 0.007 3 12 0.035 2 7 0.180
34 Design activity was  conducted re the innovation 6 13 0.167 5 7 0.774 1 6 0.125
40
Fairs and exhibitions  that firm's  engineers have been to and seen new products/processes 
produced by other firms fontributed to design activities 15 10 0.454 11 4 0.118 4 6 0.754
114
You havenoticed medium interest of the education sector/unis/local politics/labour market 
institutions after introducing the innovation 8 7 1.000 2 6 0.289 6 1 0.125
Software sector  (N=24)
Observations  for innovations Observations  for innovations Observations for innovations
User 
involvement 
and orientation
R&D 
management 
and 
collaboration
Innovation 
source and 
collaboration
Other
All sample  (N=45 pairs)
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major message of SAPPHO remains equally relevant today. This applies especially to 
distinction between users’ needs and market demand which both remains essential to 
coupling with R&D. Successful innovators have stronger user orientation and better 
understanding of market demand.  
 
Although, CEECs are catching up economies continuous and strategic R&D is essential to 
generation of greater commercial success from innovation activities.  However, rather than 
scale of own R&D budget or personnel what distinguishes successful from less successful 
innovators is  their capacity to cooperate with external R&D organisations and resources 
employed or contracted in partner R&D organisation.   Despite great importance of R&D 
collaboration innovation in successful cases originates from within the companies which are 
significantly more involved in collaborative innovation than less successful cases and which 
may include foreign firms and/or subcontracting partners.   
 
When compared to SAPPHO which showed that the efficiency of the R&D process seems 
to matter we are surprised by the greater than expected importance of R&D collaboration. 
In fact, in machine tool industry this group of factors is the only one that distinguishes 
between successful and less successful cases. Still, the major two discriminating factors 
are user involvement and orientation with understanding of market. R&D and innovation 
collaboration are relatively less significant when compared to former two factors.  It is very 
interesting that innovation policy in CEE countries is not concerned with users and demand 
side factors (see Edler, 2011) which based on our research seem to be the major 
differentiating factors in innovations in CEE. There is strong focus in CEE policies on 
science – industry linkages but largely upstream oriented – i.e. driven by technology push 
incentives and opportunities (Radosevic, 2011). However, our results demonstrate 
irrelevance of this perspective and much greater relevance of downstream R&D and 
innovation collaborations which are driven by firms with the view of enhancing market led 
innovation. We believe that our results give relevant empirical basis for re-examination of 
the current approaches.  
 
In general terms, our results have reiterated the importance of users and user orientation 
for commercially successful innovations as well as have confirmed that innovation is largely 
market based process. This research has re-confirmed the irrelevance of entirely R&D-led 
models of innovation and policies, especially in catching up economies like CEECs. Our 
results have re-confirmed the importance of users and markets needs in innovation process 
when compared to technology-push or R&D driven innovations.  The findings do not 
undermine the importance of R&D conduct, but they show that only policies that are able to 
enhance user/market – R&D interaction are relevant for KIEs.  
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Table 7. Characteristics of successful innovators when compared to less successful (this research) or failures 
(SAPPHO) 
SAPPHO’s findings Our findings 
Understanding of user needs  Understanding of user needs but also user 
involvement  
Attention to marketing Understanding of market 
Perform their development work more efficiently Successful R&D collaborations 
Effective use of outside technology and scientific 
advice 
Successful innovation collaborations 
The responsible individuals in the successful 
attempts are usually more senior 
 
 
 
This research is limited by sample of innovation pairs which is relatively small (45). 
However, given information and labour intensive nature of case study research on which 
our results are based it is unlikely that this can be increased much in further research. In 
terms of methodology it is possible in future research  to apply qualitative comparative 
analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 1987; 2000) in order to explore profiles of innovations 
(configurations) and try in alternative way to establish which profiles are associated with 
successful vs. less successful cases of knowledge intensive entrepreneurship. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Indicators used in the research, number of observations for successful and less successful innovation by 
industry and results of binomial tests.   
 
 
 
Machine tools sector  (N=21)
statement ‐ indicator successful  less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
successful  less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
successful  less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
1 The innovation was new to the firm 5 19 0.007 3 12 0.035 2 7 0.180
2 The innovation was new to the country 14 5 0.064 9 2 0.065 5 3 0.727
3 The innovation was new to the world 12 7 0.359 6 4 0.754 6 3 0.508
4 The firm took out patent for the innovation 5 4 1.000 1 2 1.000 4 2 0.688
5 Firm'semployees published in scientific papers related to the innovation 4 8 0.388 3 4 1.000 1 4 0.375
6 The innovation was awarded prize(s) 14 7 0.189 9 6 0.607 5 1 0.219
7 The innovation arose solely in the company 9 6 0.617 5 2 0.453 4 4 1.000
8 The innovation arose solely from outside the company 4 0 0.125 3 0 0.250 1 0 _
9 The innovation arose partly in the company 3 10 0.092 0 6 0.031 3 4 1.000
10 For the innovations which originated from outside, the university was the main source 0 4 0.125 0 1 _ 0 3 0.250
11 For the innovations which originated from outside, the research institute was the main source 1 1 1.000 0 1 _ 1 0 _
12 For the innovations which originated from outside, the government was the main source 0 1 _ 0 1 _ 0 0 _
13 For the innovations which originated from outside, the customer was the main source 2 2 1.000 2 2 1.000 0 0 _
14 For the innovations which originated from outside, the individual(s) was the main source 0 4 0.125 0 4 0.125 0 0 _
15 For the innovations which originated from outside, the parent firm was the main source 0 0 _ 0 0 _ 0 0 _
16 For the innovations which originated from outside, the supplier was the main source 1 1 1.000 0 0 _ 1 1 1.000
17 For the innovations which originated from outside, the competitor was  the main source 0 0 _ 0 0 _ 0 0 _
18 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the university 5 5 1.000 1 2 1.000 4 3 1.000
19 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the research institute 7 2 0.180 1 2 1.000 6 0 0.031
20 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the government 0 1 _ 0 1 _ 0 0 _
21 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with another firm 3 4 1.000 2 3 1.000 1 1 1.000
22 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the customer 8 9 1.000 7 6 1.000 1 3 0.625
23 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the individual (s) 3 2 1.000 3 2 1.000 0 0 _
24 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the parent firm 1 3 0.625 1 1 1.000 0 2 0.500
25 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the supplier 8 3 0.227 2 0 0.500 6 3 0.508
26 If the firm had any outside collaboration, it collaborated with the consultant(s) 5 3 0.727 3 2 1.000 2 1 1.000
27 The kind of collaboration was strategic alliance 1 1 1.000 1 1 1.000 0 0 _
28 The kind of collaboration was R&D agreement 11 4 0.118 1 2 1.000 10 2 0.039
29 The kind of collaboration was technical cooperation agreement 9 5 0.424 3 3 1.000 6 2 0.289
30 The kind of collaboration was licensing agreement 0 4 0.125 0 4 0.125 0 0 _
31 The kind of collaboration was subcontracting 9 2 0.065 6 0 0.031 3 2 1.000
32 The kind of collaboration was marketing/export promotion 0 2 0.500 0 1 _ 0 1 _
33 The kind of collaboration was research contract‐out 1 0 _ 0 0 _ 1 0 _
34 Design activity was conducted re the innovation 6 13 0.167 5 7 0.774 1 6 0.125
35 Customers' design was the source of design activity conducted 2 2 1.000 2 0 0.500 0 2 0.500
36 Other firms' designs were the source of design activity conducted 1 5 0.219 0 2 0.500 1 3 0.625
37 The firm's own design was the source of design activity conducted 7 13 0.263 5 8 0.581 2 5 0.453
38 Research institutes/universities contributed to design activities 4 6 0.754 0 2 0.500 4 4 1.000
39 Foreign firms contributed to design activities 9 2 0.065 6 2 0.289 3 0 0.250
40
Fairs and exhibitions that firm's engineers have been to and seen new products/processes 
produced by other firms fontributed to design activities 15 10 0.454 11 4 0.118 4 6 0.754
41 Personal contacts established at the conferences contribute to design activities 3 6 0.508 3 4 1.000 0 2 0.500
42 News  about new products in the magazines and journals of your field contributed to design  5 5 1.000 4 5 1.000 1 0 _
43 Firm's own researchers in its own labs contributed to design activities 8 10 0.815 6 5 1.000 2 5 0.453
44 Potential users were involved a  lot during the development stage of the innovation 22 10 0.050 13 3 0.021 9 7 0.804
45 Potential users were involved a  little during the development stage of the innovation 11 17 0.345 5 10 0.302 6 7 1.000
46 Potential users were not involved at all during the development stage of the innovation 1 6 0.125 0 5 0.063 1 1 1.000
47 The users found the innovation technologically problematic or difficult to use 13 8 0.383 9 8 1.000 4 0 0.125
48 If there were user problems, they became apparent early in development 14 7 0.189 8 4 0.388 6 3 0.508
49 If there were user problems, they became apparent later in development 2 8 0.109 1 6 0.125 1 2 1.000
50 If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch 12 4 0.077 9 2 0.065 3 2 1.000
51 A lot of steps were taken to educate the users 16 5 0.027 12 3 0.035 4 2 0.500
52 A little number of steps were taken to educate the users 8 9 1.000 4 5 1.000 4 4 1.000
53 No steps were taken at all to educate the users 3 12 0.035 0 8 0.008 3 4 1.000
54 A lot of modifications were introduced as a result of user experience 10 6 0.454 7 3 0.344 3 3 1.000
55 A few modifications were introduced as a  result of user experience 11 8 0.648 4 4 1.000 7 4 0.549
56 No modifications were introduced as a  result of user experience 2 7 0.180 0 3 0.250 2 4 0.500
57
There were competitors already at work in the same field when it was decided to pursue the 
innovation 13 9 0.523 12 4 0.077 1 5 0.219
58 The innovation was developed in the light of what competitors were doing or apparently  11 8 0.648 7 3 0.344 4 5 1.000
59 There were a  lot of after sales problems 2 1 1.000 2 1 1.000 0 0 _
60 There were a  little after sales problems 14 8 0.286 9 2 0.065 5 6 1.000
61 There were NO after sales problems at all 8 9 1.000 1 5 0.219 7 4 0.549
62 Amount of  total R&D expenditure for the innovation 17 11 0.345 10 3 0.092 7 8 1.000
63 There was a  formal R&D department in the firm to carry out the research activities for the  8 10 0.815 5 7 0.774 3 3 1.000
64
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and it was  the entire R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation 1 12 0.003 0 7 0.016 1 5 0.219
65
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and it was  part of the R&D department in the 
firm to carry out the research activities for the innovation 15 6 0.078 8 3 0.227 7 3 0.344
All sample  (N=45 pairs) Software sector  (N=24)
Observations for innovations Observations for innovations Observations for innovations
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Table A1 continued 
 
 
 
Machine tools sector  (N=21)
statement ‐ indicator successful  less successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed) successful 
less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed) successful 
less 
successful 
sig.(2‐
tailed)
66
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the manager of the firm was also the 
leading person in the R&D department 7 7 1.000 6 7 1.000 1 0 _
67
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the chief engineer of the firm was the 
leading person in the R&D department  5 6 1.000 0 4 0.125 5 2 0.219
68
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the manager of the R&D department was 
the leading person in the R&D department 5 5 1.000 3 3 1.000 2 2 1.000
69
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and project manager of the innovation was  the 
leading/responsible person in the R&D department 1 6 0.125 1 2 1.000 0 4 0.125
70
Percentage of the existing manpower in the R&D department of the firm allocated for the R&D 
work regarding the innovation 18 17 1.000 10 10 1.000 8 7 1.000
71
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the staff in the R&D department worked in 
an unstructured basis 4 4 1.000 0 0 _ 4 4 1.000
72
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the staff in the R&D department worked in 
sections based on academic disciplines 2 4 0.688 0 4 0.125 2 0 0.500
73
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the staff in the R&D department worked in 
sections based on product/process group 8 5 0.581 5 5 1.000 3 0 0.250
74
There was a  formal R&D department in the firm and the staff in the R&D department worked in 
project teams 6 8 0.791 5 3 0.727 1 5 0.219
75 There was an external R&D department involved in the innovations 11 7 0.481 2 2 1.000 9 5 0.424
76 Number of external R&D departments that were concerned with the innovation 12 7 0.359 2 2 1.000 10 5 0.302
77
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was conducted at a 
university R&D department 8 4 0.388 0 2 0.500 8 2 0.109
78
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was conducted at a 
research institute R&D department 4 1 0.375 0 1 1.000 4 0 0.125
79
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was conducted at 
another company's R&D department 3 4 1.000 2 1 1.000 1 3 0.625
80
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and some of the development work was conducted at an 
R&D department abroad 1 1 1.000 0 1 _ 1 0 _
81
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number of qualified scientists and engineers in this 
external R&D department 12 4 0.077 2 2 1.000 10 2 0.039
82
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the manager of the firm was also the leading person 
for this R&D work in the external R&D department 1 4 0.375 0 1 _ 1 3 0.625
83
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the chief engineer of the firm was  the leading person 
for this R&D work in the external R&D department 0 1 _ 0 1 _ 0 0 _
84
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the manager of the external R&D department was the 
leading person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 4 2 0.688 2 0 0.500 2 2 1.000
85
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and there was another person (i.e. project manager) in 
the firm as the leading person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 6 0 0.031 0 0 _ 6 0 0.031
86
If there was no formal R&D unit in the firm, there was  a systematic and periodically 
reconsidered R&D program 10 4 0.180 5 2 0.727 5 2 0.219
87
The percentage of existing R&D manpower allocated to the R&D work regarding the innovation 
within the systematic R&D program 11 9 0.824 6 6 1.000 5 3 0.727
88 The manager of the firm was also the leading person for this systematic R&D work 9 4 0.267 4 3 1.000 5 1 0.219
89 The chief engineer of the firm was the leading person for this systematic R&D work 6 6 1.000 6 3 0.508 0 3 0.250
90 The firm used financial assistance from the government/EU re the innovation 8 4 0.388 3 3 1.000 5 1 0.219
91 The firm used financial assistance from the parent firm re the innovation 1 0 _ 1 0 _ 0 0 _
92 The firm used financial assistance from private sources re the innovation 7 5 0.774 5 5 1.000 2 0 0.500
93 The demand for  the innovation was estimated by R&D personnel 9 6 0.607 5 3 0.727 4 3 1.000
94 The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm 13 3 0.021 8 1 0.039 5 2 0.219
95 The demand for the innovation was estimated by commissioned market research 2 0 0.500 2 0 0.500 0 0 _
96 The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge 16 5 0.027 11 3 0.057 5 2 0.453
97 The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests 18 7 0.043 11 3 0.057 7 4 0.549
98 Demand for the innovation was estimated by other sources in the firm 8 4 0.388 5 4 1.000 3 0 0.250
99 The demand for the innovation was estimated by published literature 3 1 0.625 2 1 1.000 1 0 _
100 The demand for  the innovation was estimated by pure speculation 1 3 0.625 0 3 0.250 1 0 _
101 The demand for  the innovation was estimated by single outside request 3 7 0.344 2 3 1.000 1 4 0.375
102
The market situation confronting the firm in its regular product lines at the start of the 
innovation project was highly competitive 13 9 0.523 9 2 0.065 4 7 0.549
103
The market situation confronting the firm in its regular product lines at the start of the 
innovation project was moderately competitive 10 10 1.000 4 6 0.754 6 4 0.754
104
The market situation confronting the firm in its regular product lines at the start of the 
innovation project was with little or no competition at all 1 3 0.625 1 3 0.625 0 0 _
105 The innovation was a  marketing decision 15 13 0.851 8 5 0.581 7 8 1.000
106 The innovation was a  production decision 13 9 0.523 7 5 0.774 6 4 0.754
107 The innovation involved going into an unrelated market area 1 8 0.039 0 6 0.031 1 2 1.000
108
The innovation involved a  little concious resconstruction of the marketing organisation to 
accomodate the innovation 4 2 0.688 4 2 0.688 0 0 _
109
The innovations involved a  lot of concious resconstruction of the marketing organisation to 
accomodate the innovation 2 1 1.000 1 1 1.000 1 0 _
110 The innovation was aimed at a  preconcieved market but found a  different outlet 3 2 1.000 1 1 1.000 2 1 1.000
111 Other local/national firms entered the market area  of the innovation after introducing it by  12 9 0.664 6 3 0.508 6 6 1.000
112
Other international firms entered the market area of the innovation after introducing it by your 
company 3 0 0 0 _ 3 0 0.250
113
You have noticed slight interest of the education sector/unis/local politics/labour market 
institutions after introducing the innovation 12 9 0.664 7 5 0.774 5 4 1.000
114
You havenoticed medium interest of the education sector/unis/local politics/labour market 
institutions after introducing the innovation 8 7 1.000 2 6 0.289 6 1 0.125
115
You have noticed large interest of the education sector/unis/local politics/labour market 
institutions after introducing the innovation 10 5 0.302 7 3 0.344 3 2 1.000
Observations for innovations Observations for innovations Observations for innovations
All sample  (N=45 pairs) Software sector  (N=24)
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Table A2. Confirmatory factor analyses results for a 3 factor model (N=45). 
 
 
 
Table A3. Confirmatory factor analyses results for a 5 factor model (N=45). 
 
 
  
Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
Potential users were invo lved a lo t during the development stage of the innovation 0.194 ‐0.723 0.163
A lo t o f steps were taken to  educate the users ‐0.096 0.755 ‐0.176
If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch ‐0.037 ‐0.432 ‐0.184
The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm 0.129 0.292 0.558
The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge 0.112 0.147 ‐0.757
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was the entire R&D department in the 
firm to  carry out the research activities for the innovation 0.067 0.362 0.115
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the pro ject manager for the innovation in your firm 
was the leading/responsible person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 0.051 0.025 0.664
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was part o f the R&D department in the 
firm to  carry out the research activities for the innovation 0.452 0.344 0.336
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number of qualified scientists and engineers in this 
external R&D department 0.755 0.161 0.175
The kind of co llaboration was subcontracting 0.419 ‐0.126 ‐0.086
Foreign firms contributed to  design activities 0.515 0.356 ‐0.374
The innovation arose partly in the company 0.692 ‐0.301 ‐0.201
The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests 0.496 0.008 0.196
Rotation: Varimax, Kaiser‐Meyer‐Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.302, Bartlett's Test of Sphericity is significant at 0.000, 
total variance explained (cum %): 43.98.
Indicators Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Potential users were invo lved a lo t during the development stage o f the innovation 0.032 0.835 ‐0.162 0.113 0.043
A lot o f steps were taken to  educate the users 0.231 ‐0.535 0.246 ‐0.256 0.467
If there were user problems, they became apparent after launch 0.048 0.597 0.272 ‐0.327 ‐0.036
The demand for the innovation was estimated by market research of the firm 0.267 ‐0.342 ‐0.519 0.019 ‐0.158
The demand for the innovation was estimated by previous knowledge 0.111 ‐0.032 0.833 ‐0.095 0.001
The demand for the innovation was estimated by customer's requests 0.428 ‐0.134 ‐0.094 0.179 ‐0.671
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was the entire R&D department in the 
firm to  carry out the research activities for the innovation 0.163 ‐0.081 ‐0.144 0.138 0.825
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and the pro ject manager for the innovation in your firm 
was the leading/responsible person for this R&D work in the external R&D department 0.726 ‐0.143 ‐0.143 ‐0.136 ‐0.133
There was/were external R&D unit(s) and number o f qualified scientists and engineers in this 
external R&D department 0.852 0.197 0.003 0.166 0.185
There was a formal R&D department in the firm and it was part o f the R&D department in the 
firm to  carry out the research activities for the innovation 0.291 0.138 ‐0.600 ‐0.167 0.184
The kind of collaboration was subcontracting ‐0.117 ‐0.080 ‐0.079 0.873 ‐0.004
Foreign firms contributed to  design activities 0.369 ‐0.285 0.413 0.394 0.051
The innovation arose partly in the company 0.314 0.358 0.204 0.611 ‐0.049
Rotation: Varimax, Kaiser‐Meyer‐Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy: 0.302, Bartlett's Test of  Sphericity is significant at 0.000, total variance explained   
(cum %): 65.71.
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